Operator-grade
The team that scopes your work in Croydon is the team that runs it. The architects are the operators. Findings come from people who've actually exploited what they're describing — not desk research.
Independent ai red teaming for Croydon-based finance organisations — board-ready reporting mapped to NCSC Cyber Assessment Framework and UK GDPR. Adversarial testing for production LLM and AI systems — prompt injection, jailbreaks, training-data leakage, agentic tool abuse and model manipulation tested against your real deployments.
The finance, retail, tech concentration around Croydon sees wire-transfer fraud, instant-payment abuse and identity-driven account takeover. Our ai red teaming work in London is scoped against this real threat profile, not a generic checklist.
Every finding ships with a control reference against NCSC Cyber Assessment Framework and UK GDPR, with NCSC UK guidance cited where it changes the remediation priority. Board reporting follows the FCA SYSC operational resilience expectation set.
Basalt delivers ai red teaming to organisations across Croydon and the wider London region (population ~395k). The finance, retail, tech sectors that anchor the region face a distinct threat profile — wire-transfer fraud, instant-payment abuse and identity-driven account takeover — and our engagements are scoped to that, not a generic playbook. Reporting maps cleanly to the NCSC Cyber Assessment Framework and UK GDPR that British boards already use, with regulator context (NCSC UK) called out where it changes a remediation priority.
The team that scopes your work in Croydon is the team that runs it. The architects are the operators. Findings come from people who've actually exploited what they're describing — not desk research.
Local context matters: wire-transfer fraud, instant-payment abuse and identity-driven account takeover. Basalt's Croydon engagements are scoped to the threat profile of finance teams in London, not a generic global checklist.
Where most regional providers are still testing for 2022 threat models, Basalt actively works agentic AI tool-abuse and indirect prompt injection at scale and identity-first attack chains across federated SaaS in production engagements. Forward-leaning, not theoretical.
Cyber security in United Kingdom can't be done with last year's threat models. The Basalt practice runs against current attacker tradecraft — agentic AI abuse, MCP and AI-tool supply chain, post-quantum readiness — alongside the legacy infrastructure work that still keeps most organisations awake at night.
Most Croydon engagements scope inside one week and start within two. Retainer clients can trigger work the same day. We do not pipeline British clients through junior teams — a senior consultant scopes and runs the work end-to-end.
Both. Sensitive work — classified-adjacent environments, live incident response, OT walkthroughs — gets on-site time in Croydon and the wider London region. Routine assessments and detection engineering run remote with a tight feedback loop.
Every finding ships with a control reference against the NCSC Cyber Assessment Framework and UK GDPR so your compliance team is not re-mapping our report. Where NCSC UK guidance exists for the specific finding, we cite it inline. Board-level reporting follows the FCA SYSC operational resilience expectation set.
The finance sector concentration in Croydon drives a different threat model than a generic British engagement — wire-transfer fraud, instant-payment abuse and identity-driven account takeover. Our scoping reflects that, and so does the test library we bring to the work.
Yes — this is core to how we work. Basalt actively researches and tests against agentic AI tool-abuse and indirect prompt injection at scale, MCP server and AI-tool supply chain compromise and identity-first attack chains across federated SaaS. Most regional providers haven't mapped these attack paths; we run them in production against client systems with explicit scope.
Strategic cyber security consulting
CREST-aligned penetration testing
Source code review and SAST/DAST integration
ITDR for identity-driven attacks