Senior-led delivery
Every Toowoomba engagement is led by a senior consultant — no junior pipelines, no resold capacity. Australian clients deal directly with the operators doing the work.
For agriculture teams across QLD, cyber security consulting only generates value when it's mapped to the regulatory environment you actually operate in — ASD Essential Eight and SOCI Act. Basalt scopes every engagement to that bar. Independent cyber security consulting that aligns your security investment with the risks that actually matter to your business — board-ready reporting, no vendor bias, measurable outcomes.
The agriculture, logistics concentration around Toowoomba sees IoT sensor compromise, supply-chain ransomware and grant/subsidy fraud. Our cyber security consulting work in QLD is scoped against this real threat profile, not a generic checklist.
Every finding ships with a control reference against ASD Essential Eight and SOCI Act, with ACSC guidance cited where it changes the remediation priority. Board reporting follows the APRA CPS 234 expectation set.
Basalt delivers cyber security consulting to organisations across Toowoomba and the wider QLD region (population ~140k). The agriculture, logistics sectors that anchor the region face a distinct threat profile — IoT sensor compromise, supply-chain ransomware and grant/subsidy fraud — and our engagements are scoped to that, not a generic playbook. Reporting maps cleanly to the ASD Essential Eight and SOCI Act that Australian boards already use, with regulator context (ACSC) called out where it changes a remediation priority.
Every Toowoomba engagement is led by a senior consultant — no junior pipelines, no resold capacity. Australian clients deal directly with the operators doing the work.
Findings and roadmaps reference the regulatory environment your business actually operates in — ASD Essential Eight and SOCI Act. Board-level reporting follows the APRA CPS 234 expectation set, so what we deliver lands without translation.
We actively research and test agentic AI tool-abuse and indirect prompt injection at scale, MCP server and AI-tool supply chain compromise and post-quantum cryptographic readiness (NIST PQC migration) — attack paths most regional providers still haven't mapped. Forward-thinking cyber defence, not last year's playbook.
Cyber security in Australia can't be done with last year's threat models. The Basalt practice runs against current attacker tradecraft — agentic AI abuse, MCP and AI-tool supply chain, post-quantum readiness — alongside the legacy infrastructure work that still keeps most organisations awake at night.
Most Toowoomba engagements scope inside one week and start within two. Retainer clients can trigger work the same day. We do not pipeline Australian clients through junior teams — a senior consultant scopes and runs the work end-to-end.
Both. Sensitive work — classified-adjacent environments, live incident response, OT walkthroughs — gets on-site time in Toowoomba and the wider QLD region. Routine assessments and detection engineering run remote with a tight feedback loop.
Every finding ships with a control reference against the ASD Essential Eight and SOCI Act so your compliance team is not re-mapping our report. Where ACSC guidance exists for the specific finding, we cite it inline. Board-level reporting follows the APRA CPS 234 expectation set.
The agriculture sector concentration in Toowoomba drives a different threat model than a generic Australian engagement — IoT sensor compromise, supply-chain ransomware and grant/subsidy fraud. Our scoping reflects that, and so does the test library we bring to the work.
Yes — this is core to how we work. Basalt actively researches and tests against agentic AI tool-abuse and indirect prompt injection at scale, MCP server and AI-tool supply chain compromise and identity-first attack chains across federated SaaS. Most regional providers haven't mapped these attack paths; we run them in production against client systems with explicit scope.
Adversarial testing for LLMs and AI systems
CREST-aligned penetration testing
Source code review and SAST/DAST integration
ITDR for identity-driven attacks