Senior-led delivery
Every Yishun engagement is led by a senior consultant — no junior pipelines, no resold capacity. Singaporean clients deal directly with the operators doing the work.
Singaporean healthcare teams in Yishun pick Basalt for penetration testing because the work is scoped to their actual threat model, not a generic checklist. CREST-aligned penetration testing for web apps, APIs, internal networks and cloud environments — findings ranked by exploitability, not just CVSS.
The healthcare, manufacturing concentration around Yishun sees ransomware targeting EHR systems, medical device firmware and PHI exfiltration via third parties. Our penetration testing work in North Region is scoped against this real threat profile, not a generic checklist.
Every finding ships with a control reference against MAS TRM and Cybersecurity Act 2018, with CSA / MAS guidance cited where it changes the remediation priority. Board reporting follows the MAS Notice 655 expectation set.
Basalt delivers penetration testing to organisations across Yishun and the wider North Region region (population ~225k). The healthcare, manufacturing sectors that anchor the region face a distinct threat profile — ransomware targeting EHR systems, medical device firmware and PHI exfiltration via third parties — and our engagements are scoped to that, not a generic playbook. Reporting maps cleanly to the MAS TRM and Cybersecurity Act 2018 that Singaporean boards already use, with regulator context (CSA / MAS) called out where it changes a remediation priority.
Every Yishun engagement is led by a senior consultant — no junior pipelines, no resold capacity. Singaporean clients deal directly with the operators doing the work.
Findings and roadmaps reference the regulatory environment your business actually operates in — MAS TRM and Cybersecurity Act 2018. Board-level reporting follows the MAS Notice 655 expectation set, so what we deliver lands without translation.
We actively research and test agentic AI tool-abuse and indirect prompt injection at scale, MCP server and AI-tool supply chain compromise and post-quantum cryptographic readiness (NIST PQC migration) — attack paths most regional providers still haven't mapped. Forward-thinking cyber defence, not last year's playbook.
Cyber security in Singapore can't be done with last year's threat models. The Basalt practice runs against current attacker tradecraft — agentic AI abuse, MCP and AI-tool supply chain, post-quantum readiness — alongside the legacy infrastructure work that still keeps most organisations awake at night.
Most Yishun engagements scope inside one week and start within two. Retainer clients can trigger work the same day. We do not pipeline Singaporean clients through junior teams — a senior consultant scopes and runs the work end-to-end.
Both. Sensitive work — classified-adjacent environments, live incident response, OT walkthroughs — gets on-site time in Yishun and the wider North Region region. Routine assessments and detection engineering run remote with a tight feedback loop.
Every finding ships with a control reference against the MAS TRM and Cybersecurity Act 2018 so your compliance team is not re-mapping our report. Where CSA / MAS guidance exists for the specific finding, we cite it inline. Board-level reporting follows the MAS Notice 655 expectation set.
The healthcare sector concentration in Yishun drives a different threat model than a generic Singaporean engagement — ransomware targeting EHR systems, medical device firmware and PHI exfiltration via third parties. Our scoping reflects that, and so does the test library we bring to the work.
Yes — this is core to how we work. Basalt actively researches and tests against agentic AI tool-abuse and indirect prompt injection at scale, MCP server and AI-tool supply chain compromise and identity-first attack chains across federated SaaS. Most regional providers haven't mapped these attack paths; we run them in production against client systems with explicit scope.
Strategic cyber security consulting
Adversarial testing for LLMs and AI systems
Source code review and SAST/DAST integration
ITDR for identity-driven attacks