Operator-grade
The team that scopes your work in Levin is the team that runs it. The architects are the operators. Findings come from people who've actually exploited what they're describing — not desk research.
Independent incident response for Levin-based horticulture organisations — board-ready reporting mapped to NZ Privacy Act 2020 and NZISM. Incident response and retainer services for the moments where minutes matter — containment, forensics, communications and lessons-learned, on call when the page fires.
The horticulture, manufacturing concentration around Levin sees cold-chain telemetry tampering, IoT-irrigation compromise and export documentation fraud. Our incident response work in Manawatu is scoped against this real threat profile, not a generic checklist.
Every finding ships with a control reference against NZ Privacy Act 2020 and NZISM, with GCSB / NCSC NZ guidance cited where it changes the remediation priority. Board reporting follows the CERT NZ Critical Controls expectation set.
Basalt delivers incident response to organisations across Levin and the wider Manawatu region (population ~20k). The horticulture, manufacturing sectors that anchor the region face a distinct threat profile — cold-chain telemetry tampering, IoT-irrigation compromise and export documentation fraud — and our engagements are scoped to that, not a generic playbook. Reporting maps cleanly to the NZ Privacy Act 2020 and NZISM that New Zealand boards already use, with regulator context (GCSB / NCSC NZ) called out where it changes a remediation priority.
The team that scopes your work in Levin is the team that runs it. The architects are the operators. Findings come from people who've actually exploited what they're describing — not desk research.
Local context matters: cold-chain telemetry tampering, IoT-irrigation compromise and export documentation fraud. Basalt's Levin engagements are scoped to the threat profile of horticulture teams in Manawatu, not a generic global checklist.
Where most regional providers are still testing for 2022 threat models, Basalt actively works agentic AI tool-abuse and indirect prompt injection at scale and identity-first attack chains across federated SaaS in production engagements. Forward-leaning, not theoretical.
Cyber security in New Zealand can't be done with last year's threat models. The Basalt practice runs against current attacker tradecraft — agentic AI abuse, MCP and AI-tool supply chain, post-quantum readiness — alongside the legacy infrastructure work that still keeps most organisations awake at night.
Most Levin engagements scope inside one week and start within two. Retainer clients can trigger work the same day. We do not pipeline New Zealand clients through junior teams — a senior consultant scopes and runs the work end-to-end.
Both. Sensitive work — classified-adjacent environments, live incident response, OT walkthroughs — gets on-site time in Levin and the wider Manawatu region. Routine assessments and detection engineering run remote with a tight feedback loop.
Every finding ships with a control reference against the NZ Privacy Act 2020 and NZISM so your compliance team is not re-mapping our report. Where GCSB / NCSC NZ guidance exists for the specific finding, we cite it inline. Board-level reporting follows the CERT NZ Critical Controls expectation set.
The horticulture sector concentration in Levin drives a different threat model than a generic New Zealand engagement — cold-chain telemetry tampering, IoT-irrigation compromise and export documentation fraud. Our scoping reflects that, and so does the test library we bring to the work.
Yes — this is core to how we work. Basalt actively researches and tests against agentic AI tool-abuse and indirect prompt injection at scale, MCP server and AI-tool supply chain compromise and identity-first attack chains across federated SaaS. Most regional providers haven't mapped these attack paths; we run them in production against client systems with explicit scope.
Strategic cyber security consulting
Adversarial testing for LLMs and AI systems
CREST-aligned penetration testing
Source code review and SAST/DAST integration